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ABSTRACT
We study a market for funding real investment in which valuation creates information on which adverse
selection can occur. Unlike in previous models, higher amounts of valuation are associated with lower
market prices and so greater returns to valuation, and this strategic complementarity in the capacity
to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. In this region, the equilibrium without valuation is always
more efficient despite funding projects that valuation would reveal as unprofitable. Valuation equilibria
look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit
to a price and, for some parameters, only if subsidized.
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1 Introduction
Most real investment — buying a house, starting or expanding a firm, or maintaining a business
in bad times — relies on external financing, a transfer of resources today for a claim on uncertain
resources in the future. Not only is external financing critical for much economic investment,
but markets for external finance seem to be fragile. History is replete with financial panics both
small and large in which the costs of funding rise and the volume of funding collapses.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of a market for the external financing of real
investment in which diﬀerent levels of funding and asset prices arise from diﬀerent levels of
valuation by market participants. In our setting, valuation has an externality — it produces
private information on which adverse selection can occur.1 More valuation worsens the pool of
assets purchased by unsophisticated investors, which lowers the price they are willing to pay,
which lowers the price that sophisticated investors have to pay for good assets, which makes
valuation more profitable. This price externality generates strategic complementarities in the
capacity to do valuation that lead to multiple equilibria. A move from an equilibrium without
valuation to an equilibrium with valuation has many features of a credit crunch: valuation
equilibria have lower prices/higher interest rate spreads, lower levels of investment and trade,
no investment by uninformed investors, and profitable valuation.
The private benefits to valuation exceed its social benefits so that the equilibrium without
valuation is always more eﬃcient than the equilibrium with valuation when both are possible.
Further, there are parameters for which the equilibrium is unique and involves valuation, and
yet funding all projects without valuation would be more eﬃcient. In terms of policy, to ensure
the eﬃcient outcome requires not just a large, unsophisticated investor, but one with the ability
to commit to a price ex ante and, when the more eﬃcient outcome is not an equilibrium, a price
subsidy.
Specifically, we consider a rational expectations model of a competitive market in which
1As we discuss, this channel is diﬀerent from that in Dang (2008) and Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012) both
technically — valuation in our model is information about the joint surplus from trade — and economically — the
externality in our model operates through the market price.
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risk neutral real investors with projects to fund originate and sell assets at prices above their
reservation value, and risk neutral financial investors compete to buy these assets given a fixed
opportunity cost of capital. Sellers’ projects/assets are ex ante identical but ex post payoﬀs are
heterogeneous across assets.
There are two types of buyers. Unsophisticated financial investors are competitive price-
takers who buy assets at their expected present discounted values. Sophisticated financial in-
vestors invest ex ante in capacity to perform valuation and can commit to valuing before buying
any assets (modeled as an ex ante choice of available funds). Valuation capacity is costly and
limited in aggregate. The use of a unit of valuation capacity provides a signal of the quality of
an asset. Conditional on a good signal, an asset is worth more than the reservation value in
expectation; conditional on a bad signal, it is not. Valuation is unobservable and nonverifiable,
and all sellers are anonymous in the sense that the never-valued asset is indistinguishable from
the previously-valued asset to every seller except the one that performed the valuation. This
assumption is critical (and discussed in sections 5.3.2 and 6). Thus a sophisticated investor who
values an asset, observes a bad signal of the future payoﬀ, and does not buy it decreases the
average quality of the pool of assets for other investors, which lowers the equilibrium price paid
by unsophisticated investors and raises the profitability of valuation. This externality makes
valuation a strategic complement.2
There is a range of parameters over which the market has multiple equilibria. In a pool-
ing equilibrium no asset is valued, all assets are sold, and because investors with unlimited
capital compete to purchase assets, prices are high. In a valuation equilibrium sophisticated
investors invest in valuation capacity, value as many assets as they can, and only good assets
are sold/funded. In this valuation equilibrium, because sellers compete for limited buyers with
valuation capacity, prices are low. The multiplicity is due to the strategic complementarity. The
more assets are valued, the lower the average quality of unvalued assets. If the average quality
2 In the language of Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), the choice of the technology to uncover information is a
strategic complement, but information is a strategic substitute, in that sophisticated investors want diﬀerent
information from each other (information about diﬀerent assets).
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falls below the seller’s reservation value, unsophisticated investors leave the market, and only
assets that are valued and found to be good are traded.3
A pooling equilibrium has the features of a credit boom in which market volume and prices
are high while the valuation equilibrium has the features of a credit crunch in which market
volume and prices are low. A switch from a pooling equilibrium to a pure valuation equilibrium,
which we call a valuation run, has many of the features of a credit crunch or asset market
panic.4 In such a switch in equilibrium, volume falls because sellers with assets that would
have been sold in the pooling equilibrium are unable to get evaluated and so are unable to
sell in the valuation equilibrium. Prices fall because sellers lose market power to sophisticated
investors: unsophisticated investors that would have competed to to buy assets in the pooling
equilibrium are unwilling to buy and so sellers compete for limited valuation. Sophisticated
investors earn excess rents.5 Further, there is a flight to quality in two senses: only good
assets are traded/funded, and unsophisticated investors leave the market and hold their funds
elsewhere. Finally, because of the multiple equilibria, this shift need not be tied directly to
changes in fundamentals, although changes in fundamentals can bring about the possibility of
collapse and/or make collapse ultimately inevitable.
In this region of multiple equilibria, the benefit of valuation is not funding bad projects,
yet the socially eﬃcient outcome is the pooling equilibrium with no valuation.6 This follows
from the fact that the problem of the social planner choosing whether to invest in valuation
capacity is (almost) the same as the problem of a single sophisticated investor expecting a
pooling equilibrium choosing whether to invest in a unit of valuation capacity. Both problems
3Over a diﬀerent region of parameters, the market can either be in a pooling equilibrium or a mixed equilibrium
with low prices but in which sophisticated investors value as many assets as they can, buy/fund only the good
ones, and unsophisticated investors buy/fund both the rejected assets and the un-valued assets.
4 In a bank run agents protect themselves by withdrawing funds because they expect others to do so and funds
are not lent to one bank; in our model, sophisticated agents protect themselves by investing in valuation capacity
because they expect others to do so and funds are not lent to many distinct entities.
5While we do not model what happens to assets once sold, in mapping to the real world, all investors potentially
have mark-to-market losses on asset holdings due to the price decline.
6 In this sense, our paper contributes to the literature on the value of private information (Angeletos and
Pavan (2007), Mackowiak and Weiderholdt (2009), and Myatt and Wallace (2012)). Veldkamp (2011) provides
an excellent and broad discussion of this literature.
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involve facing the population share of good assets and choosing whether to fund unconditionally
or conditionally on the outcome of valuation. This result implies that switches in equilibria of
the kind just described — valuation runs — are ineﬃcient.
More strikingly, funding all assets without valuation is more eﬃcient even in some regions
where the market delivers only the valuation equilibrium. This follows from the fact that a seller
with an asset that is valued and found to be bad can sell to an unsophisticated investor at a
high price in a hypothesized pooling equilibrium. Thus, the unsophisticated investors bear the
downside risk of valuation rather than the sophisticated investor or seller associated with the
asset to be valued. Sophisticated agents ignore this externality and choose to invest in valuation
technology in regions where the social planner, internalizing this externality, would prefer all
funding occur without valuation.
Can policy correct ineﬃcient market outcomes? First, subsidizing trade or lowering inter-
est rates is counterproductive, in that it actually increases the region in which the valuation
equilibria is the only equilibrium and the region in which it is a possible equilibrium. Second,
subsidizing the payout of bad assets reduces the region in which valuation in equilibrium is
possible by reducing the economic return to separating the good from the bad. Third, a tax on
valuation capacity can ensure the pooling equilibrium wherever it is eﬃcient.7
More interestingly, because the pooling equilibrium is more eﬃcient, a large unsophisticated
investor can ensure the pooling equilibrium where it exists if it has the ability to commit to
purchase at the pooling price before sophisticated investors invest in the capacity to do valuation.
Further, there exists a subsidy for purchases such that if the large investor commits to purchase
at a high enough price, the economy would be in a pooling equilibrium wherever a pooling
equilibrium would be more eﬃcient. That said, this policy could potentially be detrimental
if the policy were misapplied so that the large investor did not deter valuation and instead
purchased previously-rejected assets at high prices.
Finally, one might consider policy changes to the model environment to make valuation ob-
7 It is important to note that the model omits many benefits of valuation, most notably that valuation might
reveal information about the aggregate payoﬀ of all assets.
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servable. Such a change would eliminate the valuation externality and make all market equilibria
eﬃcient. However, the incentive of the paired sophisticated investor and seller with a bad asset
is to hide both the fact of and the outcome of valuation suggesting that such a policy might be
hard to achieve.
In our model, markets can produce too much information. Most previous work on information
acquisition and the trading and pricing of financial assets assumes that the information acquired
either reveals information that was previously private and so solves problems of asymmetric
information, or alternatively reveals information that is common across assets and revealed by
trade and prices. These modeling assumptions each imply that if anything there is too little
information produced from a social perspective. In contrast, our key modeling choice is that
valuation creates private information about a payoﬀ that is common across agents but unique
to the particular asset. In our paper, by creating private information before trade, valuation
can cause adverse selection and market collapse, following the insights of Akerlof (1970) and
Hirshleifer (1971).
While previous papers have argued that valuation can be a strategic complement, lead to
breakdowns in trade, and have negative consequences for eﬃciency, our mechanism is theoreti-
cally and economically novel. Dang (2008) models trade as a bargaining game in which there is a
fixed gain to trade and valuation provides private information about common value. In contrast,
in our model valuation provides private information about the gains from bilateral trade. As
a result, in Dang (2008), valuation is a strategic complement because more information about
the common value on one side of the transaction worsens the winners curse on the other side.
In contrast, in our model, valuation is a strategic complement because more valuation in the
market lowers the market price which increases the private gains from valuation (and trade for
a project known to be good). Unlike in Dang (2008), informed investors always trade when
eﬃcient and more valuation in the market lowers market prices.
Secondly, and more importantly, our model includes a reason that valuation is good: it can
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reveal that a project is not worth funding.8 Thus, valuation can be socially and privately eﬃcient,
and our results on the social ineﬃciency of information are non-trivial. These diﬀerences have
important implications for policy, discussed in Section 6.
Our work is similarly diﬀerentiated from Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012), which models
market booms and freezes as driven by variation in the volatility of the common value of the
asset relative to the gains from trade following the choice of valuation capacity. Similarly, Dang,
Gorton, and Holmstrom (2009) extends the analysis of Dang (2008) to consider how to design
a security to maintain maximum liquidity in a secondary market.9 We keep the security design
problem here simple citing reasons of moral hazard and lack of funds/collateral. But more
generally, the diﬀerences between these models and ours suggest that our mechanism is more
applicable to originating assets rather than trading in secondary markets.
Finally, and most closely related to our paper, the contemporaneous paper Bolton, Santos,
and Scheinkman (2011) studies an exernality similar to ours in a model in which agents choose
whether to become sophisticated, and then compete with unsophisticated exchanges. Unlike
in our model, sellers know their type and take unobserved actions leading to a moral hazard
problem, and sophisticated buyers screen with contracts, so that the policy implications of the
two setups diﬀer. And Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011) focusses on a diﬀerent substantive
application, the size of the financial sector in the long run.
Our model omits many elements present in other theories of credit crunches; in what markets
or under what circumstances is our model likely to apply? All markets have valuation, and every
asset is valued up to some point, and then pooled with observationally equivalent assets. What
distinguishes our theory is that buyers are unable to screen previously-valued projects and
8If in our setting there were always gains from trade as in Dang (2008) then trade would never collapse.
9Two other papers on security design are worth noting. Marin and Rahi (2000) considers security design and
shows how the optimality of complete vs. incomplete markets (complete vs. incomplete revelation of private
information) depends on the costs of adverse selection on private information relative to the costs of reduced ex
ante insurance. And Pagano and Volpin (2012) consider security design and then a later equilibrium in which trade
occurs in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium so that information can get rents. While the model exhibits
an externality from valuation, it does not generate multiplicity of equilibrium (beyond those always possible in
noisy rational expectations equilibria (Breon-Drish (2011))), nor is there a role for commitment and so optimal
policy is diﬀerent.
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are able to get rents from their information gathering. These are features of lending to small
businesses and households, and some over-the-counter markets where prices are eﬀectively set
by second-price sealed bid auctions.
We see three situations where our model may prove useful in understanding credit crunches.
First, in new markets there is little record on the performance of new types of assets and the
investment associated with them. Valuation beyond a certain point is impossible and, condi-
tional on certain characteristics, all real investment is funded. As the performance of diﬀerent
assets/investments is observed, valuation costs may decline over time, and as valuation costs
decline, the collapse to the valuation equilibrium becomes possible and ultimately inevitable. In
this case, the precursors to collapse are the two main factors identified by Kindleberger (2000):
credit — worsened by leverage which is not present in the model — and displacement — a new
technology or investment opportunity. Second, in markets where initially all assets are good,
the market is automatically in a pooling equilibrium because there is no information to uncover
with valuation. But since there is no incentive to produce assets of higher quality along the
un-valued dimension, the share of good assets may naturally decline over time, which again
makes a collapse to the valuation equilibrium possible and possibly inevitable. Third, the size
of the region of multiplicity is monotonically increasing in the probability of a good signal from
valuation. Thus our model is most relevant when bad signals are rare. All three situations are
elements of the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crash and the financial crisis more generally (see
Gorton (2010)).10 Of course, for our model to capture aspects of a widespread financial crisis, it
must be that one market is particularly important — like the mortgage market — or equilibrium
selection must be correlated across markets.
10 It is also possible that our model may prove useful in undertanding high-frequency patterns where there is
evidence that informed traders can ‘cream skim’ the best deals (Seppi (1990) Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996)).
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2 The model
This section describes our model. We discuss the importance of key assumptions in Section
5.3.2.
There are a unit mass of risk-neutral sellers (real investors) seeking to sell a risky claim to
a real investment to a large number of competitive risk-neutral financial investors each with
access to unlimited funds at constant gross interest rate R > 1. First, a subset of investors
choose whether to become sophisticated and then the market opens and sellers approach buyers
until they sell as described below.
Each seller has one project/asset of fixed size, has no funds, has a reservation price of 1,
and must sell all the asset or none of it. If sold, the asset pays out a random amount D in
the future and all sellers and investors initially have common knowledge and therefore common
expectation, E [D].
Sellers are anonymous: within the period a seller turned away from one investor is able to
go to another investor and appear indistinguishable from any other seller. This assumption
provides a static analog to a continuous process with valued projects indistinguishable from new
entrants. We discussion a foundation for this structure in Appendix C.
If a paired seller and investor have a joint surplus (relative to their outside options) the
agreed upon price gives the entire surplus to the investor. That is, the investor has all the
bargaining power in a Nash bargaining situation.11
There are two types of investors. Unsophisticated investors cannot do valuation and have
a flexible amount of funds. Sophisticated investors must choose at the beginning of the period
(before any buying or selling) both how much capital to raise to purchase assets (f for funds)
and how much valuation technology to acquire (h for human capital).12 The cost of a unit of
valuation capacity is c up to χi for sophisticated investor i, and infinite thereafter, so hi ≤ χi.13
11This for simplicity. What is important is that the informed buyer can get some of the returns to a positive
signal from valuation.
12The choice of funding capacity will be shown to be a device that allows buyers to commit to buy only after
valuation.
13The limit can be due to a limited number of people with the ability to do valuation. An alternative as-
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We denote the aggregate amounts of funding and valuation capacity by F and H respectively,
and the aggregate constraint on total valuation capacity by χ¯ < 1, so
H ≤ χ¯. (1)
One unit of valuation technology allows the valuation of one asset which reveals additional
information about the payoﬀ of that particular asset. The information is binary, and the expected
payoﬀ of the valued asset is Dg = E [D|good] conditional on a good signal and Db = E [D|bad]
conditional on a bad signal. The signal is not perfect, but the same information is uncovered by
anyone doing valuation.14 A good asset is worth investing in/buying and a bad asset is not:
Dg > R > Db
The population share of assets that are good, is λ ∈ (0, 1), so that
E [D] = λDg + (1− λ)Db.
The outcome of valuation is observed by both the investor and seller, but is not observable
by other investors or sellers. Investors are not anonymous: market participants can observe
available funds, investment in valuation technology, and the prices of transactions.15
To summarize, first, sophisticated investors choose funds and valuation technology, then the
market opens. Each seller approaches a buyer/investor and either sells or repeats the process by
continuing to another buyer. Unsophisticated investors act competitively to buy/fund assets,
sumption with the same implications is that there is a limit on the amount of financial capital available to the
sophisticated investors. That is, the aggregate constraint on valuation could be due to limits-to-arbitrage rather
than a technological or resource constraint.
14An interesting paper with a similar approach to information but a diﬀerent structure and implications is
Broecker (1990) in which valuation is costless but noisy, and correlated across lenders. In equilibrium, the
winners curse from noisy valuation interacts with the adverse selection problem to generate an equilibrium with
a continuum of interest rates across diﬀerent banks.
15An equivalent assumption is that buyers are anonymous and that all agent knows the amount of valuation
capacity in the market when it opens for trade.
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and sophisticated investors use their funds and valuation technology to value and buy assets.
An equilibrium is a mass of valuation capacity purchased, a mass of projects sold, a mar-
ket price, such that all agents are optimizing. Sophisticated investors maximize profits by first
choosing valuation capacity and funding capacity taking as given their own future behavior, the
strategies of other sophisticated investors, and the price that will be available from unsophisti-
cated investors. Subsequently, sophisticated investors use funds and valuation technology and
choose prices taking as given the strategies of other agents and the price available from unso-
phisticated investors. Sellers do the same for their choices of what investors to approach and at
what prices to sell. Unsophisticated investors take the share of good projects as given and com-
pete with each other to buy these projects. We assume that indiﬀerent agents trade. Finally, we
assume that investors randomize across equivalent sellers and sellers randomize across equivalent
investors and a law of large numbers allows us to ignore uncertainty from this randomization.
The next section derives value functions and the following section describes equilibria.
3 Equilibrium value functions
This section contains two subsections that characterize behavior and prices suﬃciently to derive
the value functions for sellers and buyers: a first subsection for sophisticated investors and sellers
approaching them, and a second subsection for unsophisticated investors and sellers approaching
them. The description of the equilibria in the introduction is useful for following the initial
analysis of this section.
We denote the equilibrium price paid by a sophisticated investor for a good asset by P g and
for a bad asset by P b, and the equilibrium price paid by an unsophisticated investor by PU .
3.1 Sophisticated investors
Consider first a sophisticated buyer/investor matched with an asset that it has valued. The
potential buyer values the asset at Dg/R or Db/R, and the seller has three options besides
selling: i) go to another sophisticated investor; ii) go to an unsophisticated investor; iii) keep
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the asset and get 1. The buyer buys the asset as long as the value of the asset is greater than
the largest of these three outside options at a price equal to this largest outside option.
First note that if the asset was found to be bad, there is no price at which this asset is
purchased since the last outside option — keeping the asset — gives greater value than the value
of the asset (Db/R − 1 < 0). If the asset was found to be good, leaving this seller destroys the
value of the good information the seller and buyer share. Because valuation capacity is always
insuﬃcient to value all assets and because sellers are anonymous and valuation is nonverifiable,
sophisticated investors do not compete for valued assets and do not bid prices above the better
of the other two options.16 Thus, provided the sophisticated investor i has suﬃcient funds, an
asset found to be good is purchased at
P gi = P
g = max
£
PU , 1
¤
(2)
and sellers with bad assets continue to search for buyers. The rejected seller has two remaining
options: take its reservation value, 1, or go to an unsophisticated investor and sell for PU .
Summarizing this we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A sophisticated investor matched with an asset that it has valued
(i) buys/funds the asset at P g = max
£
PU , 1
¤
if it is good and f > P g.
(ii) does not buy/fund the asset if it is bad.
It is now useful to partially characterize PU . Since unsophisticated investors compete to
fund projects, they set prices equal to the present discounted value of dividends. When there is
no valuation, this implies PU = E [D] /R. When there is valuation, good projects are removed
from this pool, and we claim (verified below) that PU < E [D] /R.
Next, we turn to the question of the choice of funds by the sophisticated investor. If no
valuation capacity is purchased, then we assume zero funds are chosen.17 If valuation capacity
16 It is straightforward to confirm that there is surplus: PU < Dg/R or unsophisticated investors lose money,
so that P g < Dg/R for λ < 1.
17While it is possible that a sophisticated investor that does not invest in valuation capacity mimics an unso-
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is positive, sophisticated investor i chooses funds equal to the cost of purchasing all the good
assets it would find using all its valuation capacity when only un-valued sellers approach it, which
is P gλhi.18 It buys no bad assets and no assets without valuation. Why? If the sophisticated
buyer chose less than this amount of funds, costly valuation capacity would go to waste. If it
had funds to spare after funding good projects, it could buy some assets without valuation or
buy some bad assets. Buying a random un-valued asset from the population of assets is strictly
preferred whenever some valuation is happening because E [D] /R > PU . But then, knowing
this, sellers that have assets that they know are bad would approach this investor the same
way they might approach an unsophisticated investor and the sophisticated investor would no
longer be drawing a random asset from the population but instead from a pool containing both
unvalued assets and those valued and found to be bad. Thus, a sophisticated investor that
chooses funds suﬃcient to buy unvalued assets would reduce the quality of its pool of applicants
and so reduce the eﬃciency of its use of valuation, and would do so suﬃciently as to be not worth
doing. These results are summarized in the following lemma, proved in appendix A (following
the above logic).
Lemma 2 (Funding with valuation, funding capacity, and share of good assets)
If hi > 0, the sophisticated investor chooses fi = P gλhi, gets a share λ of good assets, only buys
after valuation finds the asset to be good, and uses all its funding capacity.
From here on, we refer only to valuation capacity since funding capacity is equal to valuation
capacity. We can now derive the value functions that characterize equilibria.
The value of investing in a unit of valuation technology is the probability of finding good
information times the profits made less the cost of the valuation technology:
JS = −c+ λ
µ
Dg
R
−max
£
PU , 1
¤¶
. (3)
phisticated investor and chooses a large amount of funding capacity, this does not aﬀect the equilibrium price or
quantity and we ignore this for ease of exposition.
18Sophisticated investors value a positive measure of assets and find a nonstochastic share of good projects.
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This equation is linear and decreasing in the one endogenous variable, the market price.
This linearity implies that the model has the potential for multiple equilibria if the price PU
decreases in the aggregate use of valuation.19
Turning to sellers, the (net) expected value to the uninformed seller of going to a sophisticated
investor is
WS = λP g + (1− λ)max
£
PU , 1
¤
− 1 (4)
where the max term reflects the fact that the seller found to have a bad asset chooses between
keeping the asset or selling the asset to an unsophisticated investor (and where lemma 1 implies
P g = max
£
PU , 1
¤
).
It is worth noting that, given our assumptions, investors would like to use contract terms
to screen assets and save on valuation capacity. This could be done by sophisticated investors
with an ex ante fee, which in the model is ruled out twice. First, we assume that sellers have
no funds: since no sellers have any funds, an application fee would make no profits and buy no
assets. Second, we assume that after valuation, investors have all the power in the bargaining
relationship. Given this, after valuation, the best price a seller can hope for is the market price
(or reservation value), meaning that no seller would pay a fee in equilibrium.20 An alternative
screening mechanism would be to allow investors to impose a penalty on the seller whose asset
pays oﬀ poorly — have the seller bear some risk. Two common foundations for the assumption
that the seller must sell all the asset are either moral hazard on the part of the new owner
(investor) or there being no resources for the investor to collect if the asset turns out to be bad.
19And this will also be true for more general cost functions as long as cost is not increasing faster than price is
decreasing.
20Relaxing both these assumptions and allowing a fee, investors will generally find it profitable to choose more
funds and do stochastic valuation, funding some projects without valuation. We conjecture than equilibria of
similar flavor exist in a model in which valuation is noisy and the fee is capped due to the inability to commit to
a share of the surplus (or due to the possibility of other agents mimicking sophisticated investors and charging
a fee but not funding any applicants). But we have also found models in which no equilibria exist (for similar
reasons as in insurance markets).
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3.2 Unsophisticated investors
Since all valuation capacity is used, the aggregate share of assets that are valued in equilibrium
is H. Of these, λH are found to be good and so are purchased by sophisticated investors. The
total number of assets remaining is the sum of the 1 − H assets that are not valued and the
H (1− λ) that are valued and found to be bad, so that the share of assets that are good and
seek to sell without valuation is
λ (1−H)
1− λH . (5)
When no assets are valued, H = 0, and this equals the population share of good assets, λ.
We denote by JU an unsophisticated investor’s value of a buying an asset without valuation.
This value is the expected discounted payout of the asset less the price paid for the asset
JU =
³
λ(1−H)
1−λH
´
Dg +
³
1− λ(1−H)1−λH
´
Db
R
− PU
For a seller (with or without information about its asset’s value), the (net) value of going to
an unsophisticated investor is
WU = max
£
PU − 1, 0
¤
(6)
which is also the social surplus of this transaction.
Price competition among unsophisticated investors leads to zero-profits in equilibrium, JU =
0, which implies that the price paid by the unsophisticated investors is:
PU (H) =
λ (1−H)Dg + (1− λ)Db
(1− λH)R (7)
Thus, unsophisticated investors set the market price as a function of the average quality of assets
they face in equilibrium. If that price is below the reservation value of sellers, then they do not
purchase any assets.
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To complete our specification, denote the market price at which transactions occur by
P =Max
£
PU , 1
¤
(8)
Equation (7) and the value function of the sophisticated investors, equation (3), illustrate
the main externality in the model. The profits of the sophisticated investors are decreasing in
PU which in turn is decreasing in the aggregate amount of valuation capacity purchased. More
valuation worsens the pool of asset purchased by unsophisticated investors, which lowers the
price they are willing to pay, which lowers the price that sophisticated investors have to pay for
good assets, which makes valuation more profitable.
4 Equilibria
Equilibria can now be characterized using equations (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), and our charac-
terization of optimal choice of H.
4.1 The pooling equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium all assets trade without valuation at the same price and no valuation
technology is used. For this equilibrium to exist, a sophisticated investor must find it unprofitable
to invest in valuation capacity and uninformed sellers must prefer selling to unsophisticated
investors to keeping the asset, both when H = 0:
JS ≤ 0
WU ≥ 0
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The second inequality implies PU − 1 ≥ 0 (when H = 0), so that with equation (7) these
conditions can be written as
c ≥ λ (1− λ) D
g −Db
R
(9)
λ ≥ R−D
b
Dg −Db
and all assets trade, so volume is 1, at price equal to the unconditional expected value,
P =
λDg + (1− λ)Db
R
= E [D] /R.
The pooling equilibrium exists as long as i) the marginal cost of the valuation technology
is large enough relative to the gain from valuation, and ii) the population expected return
without valuation is high enough. Note that the right hand side of the first inequality is equal
to the probability of the asset being good (λ) times the joint gain in value when it is good
((1− λ) Dg−DbR =
Dg
R −
λDg+(1−λ)Db
R =
Dg
R −P ), which is the private value of information at the
margin in the pooling equilibrium.
4.2 Equilibria with valuation
We focus on two possible types of equilibria in which investors invest in the valuation technology.
First, there is a valuation equilibrium in which sophisticated investors value and buy as many
good assets as they can and make profits, and the residual pool of assets is so poor on average
that unsophisticated investors do not buy assets. Second, there is a mixed equilibrium in which
sellers sell both with and without valuation. This occurs when the pool of assets remaining
after sophisticated investors value and purchase is good enough on average that unsophisticated
investors purchase these assets. For completeness, we also note that there is also a third type of
equilibrium with valuation, also mixed, but argue that it is a knife-edge case and not interesting.
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4.2.1 The valuation equilibrium
For the valuation equilibrium to exist, each sophisticated investor must prefer to invest in valua-
tion up to its capacity constraint, and each uninformed seller must prefer to go to a sophisticated
investor or keep its asset instead of going to an unsophisticated investor, both when H = χ¯:
JS ≥ 0
0 > WU
Since 0 > WU implies PU < 1, we have that PS = 1, and these conditions become
c ≤ λ
µ
Dg
R
− 1
¶
(10)
λ ≤ R−D
b
(Dg −Db)− χ¯ (Dg −R)
and only good assets that have been valued trade, so volume is χ¯λ < 1, at price equal to the
reservation value, P = 1.
The valuation equilibrium exists as long as i) the marginal cost of valuation is low enough
relative to the gain from valuation, which is the probability that transaction occurs times the
gain from transacting rather than the seller keeping the asset and ii) the share of good assets
is low enough (or χ¯ high enough) that buying without valuation is not profitable after χ¯λ good
assets are bought by sophisticated investors.
It is worth noting that in the pooling equilibrium (equation (9)), the benefit of a marginal
unit of valuation is the ability to avoid the unvalued assets that are bad with probability 1−λ. In
the valuation equilibrium, there is an additional benefit, the ability to avoid all assets that have
previously been found to be bad by others. Thus, as the share of good assets in the population
(λ) increases to 1 (and χ¯ near one), the valuation equilibrium can occur for higher valuation
costs (see the first equation (10)) even though in aggregate the information gained by valuation
in equilibrium is vanishing. This previews one of the results of section 5.2, that valuation can
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be socially ineﬃcient but privately optimal.21
4.2.2 The mixed equilibrium
In the second possible equilibrium with valuation, sophisticated and unsophisticated investors
both purchase assets. While as in the valuation equilibrium, sophisticated investors are at
capacity and make profits, here valuation capacity is so limited or the share of good assets so
high that the remaining, unvalued assets still have positive expected net present value and are
bought without valuation by unsophisticated investors. As above, sophisticated investors have
market power and earn the rents of valuation, but now compete with unsophisticated investors
rather than the seller’s outside option. In this equilibrium, profit maximization implies that
uninformed sellers are indiﬀerent between types of investors. Thus, for H = χ¯
JS > 0 (11)
WS = WU ≥ 0
The inequality WU ≥ 0 implies PU ≥ 1 which places an upper bound on H
H ≤ H˜ := 1−
(1− λ)
¡
R−Db
¢
λ (Dg −R) (12)
which implies that this equilibrium requires χ¯ ≤ H˜. With PU ≥ 1, the equality WS = WU
implies
P g = PU = P =
λ (1− χ¯)Dg + (1− λ)Db
(1− λχ¯)R .
Given this price, JS > 0 and χ¯ ≤ H˜ simplify to the two conditions for the equilibrium to exist:
c <
1
1− λχ¯λ (1− λ)
Dg −Db
R
(13)
λ ≥ R−D
b
(Dg −Db)− χ¯ (Dg −R)
21There is a discontinuity (outside our assumed range) at λ = 1, where the valuation equilibrium cannot occur
for c > 0 even when χ = 1.
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The first inequality is the reverse of a ‘scaled up’ (by 11−λχ¯) version of the first inequality for
the pooling equilibrium. Costs have to be low enough so that valuation is profitable, and the
‘scaling’ factor represents the diﬀerence between the temptation to purchase valuation when no
other agent does (and prices are high) and the purchase of the last unit when all other agents
purchase valuation (and so prices are lower). The second inequality states that the share of good
assets is high enough (or χ¯ low enough) that transacting without valuation is profitable after
χ¯λ good assets are bought by sophisticated investors. As χ¯→ 1, this lower bound on λ goes to
1. It is the exact complement to the second equation for the pure valuation equilibrium.
4.2.3 The ‘unstable’ mixed equilibrium
For completeness, we note that there can also exist an equilibrium in which sophisticated in-
vestors invest in an intermediate amount of valuation capacity and lower market prices just
enough to raise profits from investing in a unit of valuation to zero, and unsophisticated in-
vestors buy the remaining assets. This equilibrium is a knife-edge case, unstable in the sense
that if a sophisticated investor invested in more valuation capacity, it would reduce the quality
of the assets bought by the unsophisticated investors, valuation would make more profits, and
all sophisticated investors would like to have invested in more capacity to do valuation. Simi-
larly, a slightly higher share of assets choosing to use unsophisticated investors would raise the
unsophisticated market price, raising PS, and all sophisticated investors would prefer not to
have invested in capacity to do valuation.
In Appendix B, we show that this unconstrained mixed equilibrium exists for all parameters
such that the pooling equilibrium exists and either the valuation equilibrium or the mixed
equilibrium exists.
5 Analysis
We first formally state our main results that there are regions of multiple equilibria, then rank
them by eﬃciency, and finally, turn to the dynamics of a crash from the pooling equilibrium to
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a pure valuation or to the mixed equilibrium.
5.1 Regions of multiple equilibria
The analysis of the previous section implies the following theorem.
Proposition 1 (Multiple equilibria) In any period,
(i) the region of parameters in which the valuation equilibrium can exist overlaps the region of
parameters in which the pooling equilibrium can exist;
(ii) the region of parameters in which the mixed equilibrium can exist overlaps the region in
which the pooling equilibrium can exist.
Proof. There are allowable parameters that satisfy equation (9) and equation (10) and
allowable parameters that satisfy equation (9) and equation (13).
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Figure 1: The regions for the pooling, valuation, and constrained valuation equilibria
Figure 1 plots the areas in which each equilibrium exists in λ − c space (and for R = 1.1,
Dg = 1.14, Db = 1.09, and χ = 0.90). When the cost of valuation is low enough, only equilibria
with valuation exist. When it is high enough, only the pooling equilibrium is possible. When
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the share of good assets is low enough, no equilibria or only the pure valuation equilibrium
exist. When the share of good assets is large enough, only the pooling equilibrium exists. For
intermediate costs of valuation and an intermediate share of good assets, multiple equilibria
exist.
(R−B) / ((G−B)− χ (G−R)) = 0.714 29
5.2 Eﬃciency of equilibria
We define eﬃciency as maximizing social surplus: the sum of the value functions of the unit
mass of sellers and all investors who buy assets. We show that in the region of multiplicity, the
socially eﬃcient outcome is always the pooling equilibrium. More strikingly, there is a region
where the market delivers only an equilibrium with valuation and in which it would be more
eﬃcient to buy/fund all assets without valuation (Pareto superior with transfers).
Consider the parameter set for which the mixed equilibrium exists. Since the pooling equilib-
rium also leads to all assets trading, but without the costs of valuation, the pooling equilibrium
is more eﬃcient than the mixed equilibrium.
We next show that the parameter set over which a sophisticated investor would choose to
invest in valuation capacity is strictly larger than the parameter set over which a social planner
would choose to have investment in the valuation technology. Thus, where the market can
deliver either equilibrium, the pooling equilibrium is more eﬃcient. And in a subset of the
parameter space where the market delivers only the valuation equilibrium, the planner would
like to prohibit valuation.
To develop intuition, first assume that χ¯ is arbitrarily close to one, so there is no ineﬃciency
in the valuation equilibrium from not being able to value all assets. The planner would like to
invest in a unit of valuation capacity only if the cost, c, is less than the expected social benefit.
This benefit is the probability in the population that any given asset is bad (1 − λ), times the
gain from not trading it, which in turn is the reservation value of the seller less the present value
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of the asset (1 −Db/R).22 Given linearity (and χ¯ almost one), if the planner chooses to value
one asset, it would choose to value all assets and so the valuation equilibrium would be more
eﬃcient.
Now consider a sophisticated investor choosing whether to invest in a unit of valuation or
instead to mimic an unsophisticated investor and buy/fund one asset without valuation. In either
case, if the asset is good, the investor buys it at the market price P . The private cost of valuation
capacity is the same as in the social planner’s problem, c. The expected private benefit is the
population probability that an asset is bad — again, as in the social planner’s problem — times
the gain to this sophisticated investor of not buying it, which is the market price less the payout
of the bad asset (P −Db/R), which is greater than the benefit in the planner’s problem since
the pooling price is greater than or equal to the reservation value (P ≥ 1) for any parameters in
which the pooling equilibrium exists. Thus, the planner prefers the pooling equilibrium for all
parameter values for which a sophisticated investor acting alone does not undermine it — that
is for all parameter values where it exists, including the region of multiplicity.
Further, for some parameter values for which only the pure valuation equilibrium exists,
trading all assets without valuation is more eﬃcient. Why? Because valuation allows investors
to avoid buying/trading bad assets. The cost of buying/trading a bad asset is the eﬀective price
paid less the payout, where the eﬀective price is the market price for the sophisticated investor
but only the reservation price for the planner. Thus, the existence of transactions without
valuation at P > 1 makes valuation worth more to sophisticated investors than to the planner,
which, for some parameters, undermines the existence of the pooling equilibrium where it would
otherwise be more eﬃcient.
When χ¯ < 1, the argument must account for the additional ineﬃciency of the pure valuation
equilibrium that some unvalued assets that have positive expected surplus are not traded/funded.
In the pure valuation equilibrium, since sellers are all at their reservation values, total social
22There is no gain associated with good projects since they are funded in both equilibria.
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Figure 2: The region where funding without valuation is more eﬃcient than equilibria with
valuation
surplus is given by the sum of the profits of the valuation done by sophisticated investors:
χ¯
µ
−c+ λ
µ
Dg
R
− 1
¶¶
If instead all assets are traded without valuation, investors all make zero profits and total social
surplus is given by the total payouts to the unit mass of sellers:
λDg + (1− λ)Db
R
− 1.
Subtracting gives that no-valuation and having all assets sold/funded is socially preferred to the
valuation equilibrium whenever the total cost of valuation capacity and the cost of not trading
the unvalued assets exceeds the benefits of not buying the valued assets found to be bad:
χ¯c+ (1− χ¯)
µ
λDg + (1− λ)Db
R
− 1
¶
≥ (1− λ) χ¯
µ
1− D
b
R
¶
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As shown in Figure 2, the lower bound of this region is the line (in λ − c space) that runs
from the point on the boundary between the pure valuation and pooling equilibria where P = 1
to the maximum λ where the pure valuation equilibrium exists and c = 0 (where P = 1 also).
To sum up, we state these results formally.
Proposition 2 Ranking of equilibria
i) For parameters such that the pooling equilibrium exists, it is more eﬃcient than the pure
valuation equilibrium, and the mixed equilibrium;
ii) for parameters such that the only market equilibrium is the mixed equilibrium, this equilibrium
is less eﬃcient than no valuation and trading all assets without valuation;
iii) for parameters such that the only market equilibrium is the pure valuation equilibrium, if
c ≥ cEff := (1− λχ¯)R− (1− λ)D
b − (1− χ¯)λDg
χ¯R
(14)
then the market equilibrium is less eﬃcient than no valuation and trading all assets without
valuation.
5.3 Discussion
This subsection first discusses implications and interpretation of our model, and then the im-
portance of five assumptions (others are discussed elsewhere, notably screening with contracts
at the end of section 3.1).
5.3.1 Implications and interpretation
A switch in equilibrium from a pooling to a pure valuation equilibrium exhibits many of the
stylized features of investment crashes. In particular, the increase in valuation is associated
with: a) Investment collapse: The volume of transactions declines from 1 to χ¯λ as only sellers
that can get their assets valued and who have good assets sell/are funded. b) Price collapse:
Transaction prices fall from λD
g+(1−λ)Db
R to 1 (spreads or interest rates increase). This occurs
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because in the pooling equilibrium assets are scarce and valuation is not required to invest
without losses, so sellers get high prices and marginal investment earns the opportunity cost of
funds. In the valuation equilibrium, only sophisticated investors purchase assets, sellers compete
for this limited valuation technology, and prices for assets are low as skilled investors earn profits
and sellers receive their outside option. c) Nonfundamental volatility: The crash is not driven
by fundamentals, but rather could be triggered by any small coordinating event. d) Credit
crunch: Some assets that would have been sold/funded in the pooling equilibrium, even some
unvalued assets (and so some good assets), cannot get sold/funded in the valuation equilibrium.
e) Flight to quality: Unsophisticated investors leave the market as the chance of buying a bad
asset increases and only good assets trade. f) Profits for sophisticated investors: Sophisticated
investors make profits/valuation capacity earns rents.
A switch in equilibrium from the pooling to the mixed equilibrium also exhibits many of
the features of an investment crash. In this case, the switch in equilibrium also exhibits an
increase in valuation, a collapse in price (but smaller) not driven by fundamentals, and profits
for sophisticated investors. But trade volume does not decline, there is no credit/funding crunch,
and there is no flight to quality.
Importantly, either type of switch in equilibrium is always ineﬃcient.
While our model is static, it is straightforward to consider repeated static model in which all
unsold assets disappear at the end of each period. One might then consider as an application
of the model a new investment opportunity which is expected to be quite profitable but which
is also initially hard to value along some dimension. Over time, returns are observed the cost of
valuation may (exogenously) decline. Similarly, since capital is flowing into the market without
careful valuation along this dimension, the quality of new assets may decline along this dimension
over time. In either case, the market can begin in a region in which it is necessarily in a pooling
equilibrium and all assets are traded at high prices. As valuation costs decline or the share of bad
assets increases, the market may enter a region where a valuation equilibrium is also possible.23
23As an aside, there is also no higher payment to the sellers of good assets relative to bad assets in the pure
valuation equilibrium as both receive their reservation values. This result would change if sophisticated investors
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In such a dynamic, investment collapses from a switch to an equilibrium with valuation are
always ineﬃcient when they occur, although they may be ultimately inevitable.
The idea that fluctuations in the strength of adverse selection in financial markets explain
their volatility is not new; notable examples driven by factors other than valuation include
Mankiw (1986), Eisfeldt (2004), Kurlat (2010), Morris and Shin (2012), Philippon and Skreta
(2012), and Malherbe (forthcoming). Our explanation rests on what we believe are the key
features of external finance: the opportunity to not undertake the investment and the possibility
of acquiring non-verifiable information on the quality of the investment. As such, our explanation
is closer to Ruckes (2004) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), which both consider how adverse
selection and lending standards leads to contractions of credit in bad times.24 The former shows
how the probability that a borrower is of a bad type changes the private value of information
which in turn is amplified through the winner’s curse. The latter focusses not on the creation
of information but rather on contract terms (specifically collateral requirements) and how these
change in response to exogenous changes in the share of new projects, about which no bank
has information, and existing projects, about which some bank has private information. In
the model, fewer new projects implies a lower share of good projects approaching banks and a
tightening of lending standards and reduced credit.25
5.3.2 Key assumptions
Turning to assumptions, first, it is not essential that valuation capacity be strictly limited, but
it must have increasing costs. If the cost of valuation capacity to sophisticated investors were
increasing in the aggregate amount of valuation purchased, our results would be qualitatively
similar (if increasing ‘enough’) except that the sophisticated investors would not earn rents
(which instead would presumably accrue to the providers of the valuation capacity). A capacity
sometimes valued the same asset and competed to buy it.
24Postdating our paper. Gorton and Ordonez (forthcoming) also draws out new insights for fluctuations in
informed lending by incorporating secondary markets.
25Similarly, and postdating our paper, Kurlat (2012) defines a new equilibrium concept in a diﬀerent model of
valuation skill in which increases in volume for sale leads to entry of valuation skill and worse adverse selection
problems and lower prices, thus rationalizing declines in price associated with fire sales through valuation eﬀects.
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constraint significantly simplifies the analysis.
Second, instead of assuming that valuation capacity is sunk, we could have assumed that the
unsophisticated investors are small and competitive price takers as in the equilibrium concept in
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002). This would lead to the same regions, would not require that so-
phisticated investors be competitive, but would change the importance of commitment for policy,
discussed next. Without sunk valuation, competition in prices by deep-pocketed unsophisticated
investors could eliminate the possibility of multiple equilibria (but not change outcomes in the
region in which the valuation equilibrium is unique but funding without valuation more eﬃcient).
Third, the assumption that the investor gets all the surplus when matched with a seller
known to be good is important only for the equations that determine where diﬀerent regions
occur (as long as the investor gets some of the surplus) and for what parties earn rents in the
valuation equilibria. This follows because, in equilibria with valuation, sophisticated buyers are
making sellers weakly prefer to sell to them, so changing this to a strict condition does not
change the qualitative results. What is important for the qualitative results is that investors get
suﬃcient surplus to cover the costs of valuation for some parameter values.
Two alternative assumptions with the same implications are i) that sophisticated investors
post prices at which they are committed to transact if they transact and ii) that sellers after a
possible valuation sell through a second-price sealed-bid auction. The proof of the first claim
follows from the fact that being able to make a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer is equivalent having all the
bargaining power in this environment. The proof of the second claim follows from the fact that
the optimal bid in a second price auction is the private value so that a buyer with information
that an asset is good wins the auction and pays the market price.
Fourth, our assumption that a seller turned away from one investor is able to go to another
investor and appear indistinguishable from any other seller is a static analog to what must
really be a dynamic process with valued projects indistinguishable from new entrants. As a
more formal foundation, we show in Appendix C that our model has the same implications if we
instead assume that sellers pursue sequential search but buyers do not know in what order the
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seller approaches potential buyers, an information structure borrowed from Zhu (forthcoming).26
Finally, the fact that valuation is not observed — that a seller with a previously-valued asset
is indistinguishable from a seller with a valued and rejected asset — is critical. But as noted, it
is also incentive compatible for the buyer-seller pair with a known-bad asset. Further, notice
that sophisticated investors prefer equilibria with valuation and unsophisticated investors are
indiﬀerent as they make no pure profits. Sellers prefer the equilibrium without valuation. This
ordering makes it suspect that investor groups that self regulate and share information, such as
through industry-wide credit bureaus, actually share this type of information.27
If the act of valuation were observable, the negative externality from valuation would be
corrected in the current model. Section 6 considers this as a potential regulatory intervention
and shows that the equilibria of this alternative model are unique and always eﬃcient.
6 Policy
There is the potential for eﬃciency-improving coordination or government policy in the regions
of the parameter space for which there are multiple equilibria and for which the market delivers
only the valuation equilibrium and c > cEff . Given that the model omits any social benefits of
private information and is solved as a rational expectation equilibrium, it is worth emphasizing
that this section studies optimal policy in the model not the real world.
To begin, why does the market not deliver the more eﬃcient equilibrium? The first answer
is that valuation has social costs greater than its private benefits — it creates information on
which adverse selection can occur. Thus a first approach to optimal policy is to tax valuation
or eliminate adverse selection.
One optimal policy is to tax units of valuation capacity with tax, τ , so that the use of
26To be clear, implicit in this assumption is the inability of sellers with unvalued projects to commit to delay
sale as in Guerrieri and Shimer (2012) and Chang (2011).
27 It seems more likely that credit bureaus, like ratings agencies, simply segment assets into markets, each of
which is either in a pooling equilibrium or valuation equilibrium where buyers do or do not investigate beyond
the credit check. It is notable that credit bureaus typically do not reveal the identity of those who conduct credit
checks and so do not reveal the purpose of the check (something that an unsophisticated investor would find
useful).
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valuation is deterred where it is ineﬃcient, which is any τ such that
τ + c ≥
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λ
¡Dg
R − 1
¢
if c ≥ cEff and λ ≤ R−Db
(Dg−Db)−χ¯(Dg−R)
1
1−λχ¯λ (1− λ)
Dg−Db
R if c ≥ cEff and λ ≥
R−Db
(Dg−Db)−χ¯(Dg−R)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
This tax ensures the pooling equilibrium wherever it is ex ante socially eﬃcient. This of course
has the real-world problems of both distinguishing this type of valuation from other types of
valuation (such as about value that is common across assets) and monitoring and observing
valuation.28
Eliminating the adverse selection that follows from valuation is more eﬀective in that it allows
the use of valuation when privately eﬃcient while eliminating its social loss. Such a policy is
at odds with the assumptions of the model and not straightforward to implement given agent’s
incentives. But consider making it public knowledge that an asset had been valued. Then valued
and rejected assets would remain unsold. Unvalued assets would be sold to unsophisticated
investors at the pooling equilibrium price (iﬀ ≥ 1). And unvalued sellers would only approach
sophisticated investors if the expected value of their outside options after valuation were at least
equal to the price available without valuation, which cannot happen unless either sophisticated
investors pay fees to unvalued sellers prior to valuation or sophisticated sellers can commit to
posted prices.29 Considering the case of commitment to posted prices, the sophisticated investor
would post the minimum price to attract unvalued assets, which is P g such that
λP g + (1− λ) ≥ λD
g + (1− λ)Db
R
.
28While we do not see this as a realistic feature of asset markets, similar policies are imposed in insurance
markets where insurance cannot be predicated on testing. And auctioneers as market makers may not make items
available for inspection prior to the auction.
29The ability of sophisticated investors to commit to prices would not change the results of sections 4 and 5. A
fee would have the same implications as the price described in the main text and would satisfy:
λ

λDg + (1− λ)Db
R

+ (1− λ) + fee = λD
g + (1− λ)Db
R
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Figure 3: The region where eliminating adverse selection delivers the eﬃcient outcome
Valuation would be undertaken when JS ≥ 0 (with PU = 1), which is when
c ≤ λ
µ
Dg
R
− 1
¶
. (15)
This boundary lies above the boundary for eﬃciency of the pooling equilibrium with anonymity
(equation (14); equations (14) and (15) converge as χ¯→ 1).
In Figure 3, the solid lines delineate the three equilibria when there is price commitment
(dotted lines delineate the regions in the original model; and the dash lines delineates the
boundary of the region in which funding without valuation was eﬃcient in the original model).
There is a larger region in which the pooling equilibrium exists, determined by equation (9) with
the first inequality replaced by the complement of equation (15). There is a new type of mixed
equilibrium in which the price is the same as the pooling equilibrium, trade is λχ¯ + (1− χ¯),
and (1− λ) χ¯ bad assets are not traded, determined by equations (9) and (15). Third, there is
a region of pure valuation in which the price is 1 and trade is λχ¯, determined by equation (10)
with the second inequality replaced by λ ≤ R−DbDg−Db . Finally, there a region of no trade which
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covers the same region as before.
Three results follow. First, with observed valuation and without anonymity, the market
equilibrium is always eﬃcient; there are no externalities and no regions of multiplicity.30 Second,
some valuation is eﬃcient for a larger set of parameters than in the original model with anonymity
because valued assets that are found to be bad are not traded, and do not reduce the average
quality of assets remaining after valuation. Finally, there are strict eﬃciency benefits to making
valuation observable and eliminating anonymity if and only if original market equilibrium has
valuation and unvalued assets are worth selling/funding (in Figure 3, any region with valuation
in the baseline model (dotted lines) and to the right of the vertical line λ = R−D
b
Dg−Db ).
Whether such a policy is optimal of course depends on its cost to implement. Further, such
a policy is not incentive compatible given only lack of anonymity. Sophisticated investors and
assets found to be bad have a joint incentive to hide the fact that a valuation was done.31
The second answer to why the market does not deliver the more eﬃcient equilibrium is that
unsophisticated agents do not have the ability to commit to purchase at high prices (they do not
compete in contracts with commitment). If unsophisticated investors had commitment, a large
unsophisticated investor could post a price equal to the price in the pooling equilibrium, P =
λDg+(1−λ)Db
R , which would ensure that the market is in the pooling equilibrium wherever it exists
as a market equilibrium. This result follows from the eﬃciency of the pooling equilibrium.32
Thus, if private agents were unable and the government were able, the government could commit
to purchase at the pooling equilibrium price. Or alternately, the government could commit to
insure all mortgages at the ex ante fair price for the pooling equilibrium.33
However, the ability of a large unsophisticated investor to commit does not ensure that
valuation is not used outside the region of multiplicity where the eﬃcient outcomes still involves
30This follows from similar arguments to section 5.2.
31Sorkin (2009) describes several episodes during the US financial crisis of commercial banks valuing an invest-
ment bank for purchase in which both parties, but especially the investment bank, tried to keep secret the fact
that a valuation was occurring.
32Since PS ≥ P to compete, it is straightforward to verify that JS < 0 wherever the pooling equilibrium is
possible, so that no sophisticated investors would invest in valuation and the multiplicity is eliminated.
33 It is not suﬃcient to insure the mortgages at an ex post fair price, since then sophisticated investors can do
valuation, insure only the bad assets, and destroy the insurance scheme.
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no valuation. To ensure this, the government further has to subsidize purchases by the large
investor, as for example by a proportional subsidy σ that implies PU = (1 + σ) λD
g+(1−λ)Db
R and
JS ≤ 0. That is, if c ≥ cEff and c ≤ λ (1− λ) Dg−DbR , then
σ =
(1− λ)
¡
Dg −Db
¢
− cR/λ
λDg + (1− λ)Db
(along with ex ante commitment by a large unsophisticated agent) ensures that JS < 0 and
the economy is in a pooling equilibrium wherever it is more eﬃcient (ignoring the cost of the
subsidy).
The model provides an interpretation of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. In the market for conforming mortgages a small fraction of assets (mortgages)
are ‘bad’ so that λ is close to one. For λ close to one, equilibria with valuation when they exist
are ineﬃcient for a wider range of parameters than when λ is lower. And a large investor
with commitment and a subsidy that funds a large fraction at high prices can keep others from
investing in valuation capacity and so optimally ensure the eﬃcient equilibrium. One might then
interpret the demise of these institutions as due to their committing to purchase at the expected
present discounted value of a random (unvalued) mortgage with λ too low to support this as
a pooling equilibrium price. In this case, the commitment to purchase (or insure) mortgages
assuming no adverse selection when the market actually has valuation and adverse selection is
extremely costly to the government (or GSE). It is also worth noting that, as with some other
mechanisms to eliminate adverse selection, there are incentives to undermine this policy: in the
pooling equilibrium, unsophisticated investors earns no rents, while in the valuation equilibrium,
sophisticated investors make profits.
This policy is related to securitization and shares some insights with the literature on how
informed issuers destroy information to create a pooling equilibrium (Gorton and Pennacchi
(1990), DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999), DeMarzo (2005), and Axelson (2007)). Our contribution
to this literature is that, when private information is endogenous, securitization requires com-
mitment and can be eﬀectively achieved without actually securitizing assets. Our results also
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of a higher real interest rate
highlight an alternative dimension of securitization — that market participants have an incentive
to undermine the process through information acquisition.
We conclude by considering two policies in which the government changes parameters of the
market.
First, cutting the interest rate is counterproductive. The set of (other) parameters for which
equilibria with valuation are possible with a lower interest rate covers that with a higher interest
rate. In contrast, raising the interest rate can held reduce valuation. These eﬀects work by
changing the present value of the information gathered by valuation, which is proportional to
Dg−Db
R without changing its cost. Figure 4 shows how raising the interest rate (from R = 1.10,
dotted lines to R = 1.11, solid lines) reduces the size of region of multiplicity and the size of
the region in which valuation can occur in conjunction with pooling. Note that the policy also
increases the region in which no investment occurs.
Second, policies which reduce the diﬀerence in payoﬀs across assets of diﬀerent quality reduce
the size of the regions in which equilibria with valuation are possible. Such policies reduce the
incentive to do valuation by reducing the benefits to separating the good from the bad. Figure
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Figure 5: The eﬀect of a higher value of bad project
5 depicts how subsidizing the payout of the bad asset bad assets (from Db = 1.090 (solid line)
to Db = 1.095 (dotted line)) increases the size of the pure pooling equilibrium and decreases the
size of the pure valuation region, and raises the size of the region where the pooling equilibrium
coexists with the mixed equilibrium. This policy has some of the flavor of the TARP programs
that provided funding and took some of the downside risk of private investors’ asset purchases.
More generally, for any given parameterization, eﬃciency can be ensured through a balanced-
budget subsidy (σ) to ultimately bad assets that is paid for by a tax (τ) on ultimately good
assets that satisfies
c ≥ λ
³
(1−τ)Dg
R − 1
´
if λ ≤ R−Db
(Dg−Db)−χ¯(Dg−R)
c ≥ 11−λχ¯λ (1− λ)
(1−τ)Dg−(1+σ)Db
R if λ ≥
R−Db
(Dg−Db)−χ¯(Dg−R)
where τλDg = σ (1− λ)Db ensures revenue neutrality. Of course this policy is eﬀective because
private agents are assumed to be unable to commit to a similar insurance contract. And, similar
to a tax on valuation, in practice this solution blunts any incentives to buy good assets in other
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(unmodeled) dimensions in which valuation may be optimal.34
How do the optimality of these policies contrast with those if the information friction were
of the type in Dang (2008) or Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012)? In both of these papers,
outlawing valuation achieves the first best since valuation has no social benefit. In our model,
the optimality of valuation depends on the cost of valuation since valuation can have social
benefits. Publicizing that a valuation was performed does nothing to improve the outcomes in
Dang (2008) or Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012), as agents in these models make the correct
inference about whomever they are facing. Finally, in these papers committing to purchase at
the uninformed expected value of the asset is generically extremely costly. Agents still have
the incentive to value the asset and transact only when valuable to them. The only way to
eliminate ineﬃciency in these other models, absent banning valuation, is to make public the
private information about common value.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a model in which valuation creates private information about
the payoﬀ from a new investment opportunity and in which the rents of this information are
captured by the informed buyer. We show the possibility of multiple equilibria with diﬀerent
levels of valuation and rank these equilibria by eﬃciency. Where equilibria without valuation
exist, valuation is always socially ineﬃcient, and where equilibria without valuation do not exist,
valuation can still be less eﬃcient than selling/funding without valuation. This result stands in
contrast to most research on financial markets which studies the discovery of information that
is common to a class of assets and is transmitted by actions through prices. In our model, too
much information is created because it creates asymmetric information and causes problems
of adverse selection, while in the canonical model information tends to be under-produced and
markets learn too late.
34Although, if the tax and subsidy plan were explicitly balanced budget and orthogonal to the mean payoﬀ,
then such a policy could avoid diminishing the incentive to collect information about asset-class wide payoﬀs.
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Appendices
A Proof of lemma 2
Lemma 3 (Funding with valuation, funding capacity, and share of good assets)
If hi > 0, the sophisticated investor chooses fi = P gλhi, gets a share λ of good assets, only buys
after valuation finds the asset to be good, and uses all its funding capacity.
Proof: Valuation cannot be slack since it is costly ex ante. Thus sophisticated investors
choose funds at least suﬃcient to buy all assets found to be good when using all their valuation
capacity.
Suppose that a sophisticated investor bought more assets than its capacity to do valuation.
In this case, any seller going to this investor would have a positive probability of selling without
valuation at a price equal to its outside option. Thus this sophisticated investor, would be
approached by sellers with previously-valued assets that they know to be bad as well as by
sellers that do not know the quality of their assets. Thus the share of good assets would be
the same as for unsophisticated investors, the market share of good assets. Since this sector
is competitive, any purchases without valuation would not make profits. At the same time
the existence of such purchases reduces the share of sellers with good assets that approach the
sophisticated investor, so that a unit of valuation is less likely to uncover a good asset. Thus,
buying only conditional on a good valuation, which would keep known-bad assets away, is more
profitable.
A sophisticated investor with funds greater than its valuation capacity can not commit to
value all assets before funding and not use these additional funds. If there is valuation in
equilibrium, then the share of good assets in the market for funding without valuation is less
than that in the population. Thus, if only unvalued assets approached the sophisticated investor,
the investor would find it profitable to fund without valuation at a price equal to the expected
value of the unvalued asset sold to the unsophisticated investors (or 1 if the unsophisticated
investors are not in the market P < 1). Thus, fi > λhi cannot be an equilibrium if we are
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to have sophisticated investors funding only after valuation. Therefore, sophisticated investors
must choose funding capacity (fi) equal to population share of good assets (λ) times their
valuation capacity (hi) and only sellers with unvalued assets with probability λ of being good
approach the sophisticated seller.
B The unconstrained mixed equilibrium
This equilibrium can occur if for some H ∈ (0, χ¯),
JS = 0 (B.1)
WS = WU ≥ 0
As for the mixed equilibrium, this thus requires, H ≤ H˜ and P g = PU = P . Equation (B.1)
implies P g = D
g
R −
c
λ = P
U (H) which, together with equation (7), implies that the level of
valuation capacity that gives indiﬀerence is
H∗ =
1
λ
− (1− λ) D
g −Db
R
1
c
(B.2)
Thus, this equilibrium exists when
H∗ ∈
³
0,min
h
χ¯, H˜
ii
. (B.3)
or
c > λ (1− λ) D
g −Db
R
c ≤ 1
1− λχ¯λ (1− λ)
Dg −Db
R
c ≤ λ
µ
Dg
R
− 1
¶
The first inequality is a strict inequality version of the first condition for the pooling equilib-
rium (equation (9)) and implies that valuation must be costly enough that not all sophisticated
investors choose to do valuation. The second inequality is the same as the second inequality
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for the mixed equilibrium, and so is the reverse of a ‘scaled up’ (by 11−λχ) version of the first
inequality for the pooling equilibrium. The final inequality is a strict inequality version of the
first condition for the valuation equilibrium (equation (10)).
It is straightforward to verify three properties. First, there is only one H∗ is unique and
thus that there is at most one unconstrained mixed equilibrium for any parameter configuration.
Second the union of the two regions of multiplicity described in Proposition 2 defines the region
in which the unconstrained mixed equilibrium exists. And third, following the logic of the mixed
equilibrium, wherever the unconstrained mixed equilibrium exists, it is less eﬃcient than the
pooling equilibrium.
C Equilibrium with sequential search as in Zhu (2013)
The trading structure of Zhu (2013) is designed to capture transactions in over-the-counter
markets. This structure adapts easily to our environment and delivers the same equilibrium
conditions as our main assumptions.
In Zhu (2013), each seller has one unit of an indivisible asset she wishes to sell and approaches
randomly chosen buyers sequentially. When a seller approaches a buyer, the buyer quotes a
price. The seller can accept the price, in which case the asset is sold at that price to that
buyer. The seller can proceed to the next buyer and get another quote. Or the seller can
return to a previous buyer for another quote. Buyers do not observe negotiations elsewhere in
the market. Thus buyers face “contact-order uncertainty — uncertainty regarding the order in
which the competing buyers are visited by the seller.” Zhu (2013) analyzes a situation in which
buyers have noisy signals of fundamental value and shows among other things that contact-order
uncertainty leads to lower quotes due to adverse selection: any seller that a buyer observes may
have been to previous buyers and been oﬀered only low prices implying that their noisy signals
of value were low. Thus a buyer — unsure whether it is seeing a seller who has been looked at
by other buyers first or a seller who has not been — oﬀers a price well below that implied by its
own noisy signal of asset value to avoid the winners curse.
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This OTC structure delivers the same equilibrium conditions as our model. Sophisticated
investors value assets and quote the market price to good projects and reject bad projects.
Unsophisticated investors approached by sellers are unsure whether the asset has been previously
valued and found to be low value or whether it has not. As a result, they quote prices equal
to the expected present value derived in the paper. The maximum of this and the reservation
value of one determines the observed market price, as in the main body of the paper.
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